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Academics and policymakers have shown great interest in cross-national comparisons of in-
tergenerational earnings mobility. However, producing consistent and comparable estimates
of earnings mobility is not a trivial task. In most countries researchers are unable to observe
earnings information for two generations. They are thus forced to rely upon imputed data from
different surveys instead. This paper builds upon previous work by considering the consistency
of the intergenerational correlation (ρ) as well as the elasticity (β), how this changes when
using a range of different instrumental (imputer) variables, and highlighting an important but
infrequently discussed measurement issue. Our key finding is that, while TSTSLS estimates of
β and ρ are both likely to be inconsistent, the magnitude of this problem is much greater for the
former than it is for the latter. We conclude by offering advice on estimating earnings mobility
using this methodology.
Keywords: Earnings mobility; two sample two stage least squares; imputation
1 Introduction
Academics have shown great interest in intergenerational
mobility – the strength of the association between indi-
viduals’ social origin and social destination. Historically
this work was the realm of sociologists (see Erikson &
Goldthorpe, 1992, for a review), but economists have added
much to this debate over the last twenty years, particularly
through their examinations of the link between the earnings
(or incomes) of fathers and sons. However, due to data lim-
itations, obtaining consistent estimates of earnings mobility
remains a non-trivial task (Black & Devereux, 2011; Blan-
den, 2013; Solon, 1992). The contribution of this paper is
to present new evidence on the consistency of Two-Sample
Two-Stage Least Squares (TSTSLS) estimates of earnings
mobility; a methodology now widely applied in this litera-
ture (Appendix A reviews almost 30 papers where it has been
used). Indeed, TSTSLS has proven to be the only way to
estimate earnings mobility in a number of countries, includ-
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ing Australia, France, Italy, Spain, Switzerland, Japan, China
and South Africa. It has therefore played an important role
in cross-national comparisons of earnings mobility; of the 20
countries included in Corak (2012), TSTSLS has been used
in more than half.
Yet, despite the important work of Björklund and Jäntti
(1997) and Nicoletti and Ermisch (2008), more needs to be
known about the consistency of TSTSLS estimates of earn-
ings mobility. We therefore build upon the aforementioned
authors’ work by extending their framework from the inter-
generational elasticity (β) to the intergenerational correlation
(ρ) quantifying the inconsistency of TSTSLS estimates when
using a range of different instrumental (imputer) variables,
and considering a potentially important (yet little discussed)
measurement issue.
The TSTSLS estimation procedure can be summarised
as follows. Ideally, earnings mobility would be estimated
via the following Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) regression
model:
YTrue = α + βXTrue + u , (1)
where YTrue are the (Log) permanent earnings of sons, and
XTrue are the (Log) permanent earnings of fathers.
Two different measures of earnings mobility would then
typically be produced. First, the intergenerational earnings
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elasticity βOLS with
βOLS =
σX,Y
σ2X
, (2)
with σX,Y being the covariance between father’s and son’s
permanent earnings, and σ2X being the variance of father’s
earnings. Second, the intergenerational correlation ρOLS with
ρOLS =
σX,Y
σ2X
· σX
σY
=
σX,Y
σX · σY , (3)
withσX being the standard deviation of father’s earnings, and
σY being the standard deviation of son’s earnings.
The measure of XTrue preferred in the literature is a time-
average of father’s annual earnings across several years
(XAVG).1 However, in many countries, earnings data cannot
be linked across generations – i.e. there is no dataset where
both father’s and son’s earnings can be observed. The TST-
SLS approach attempts to overcome this problem via impu-
tation – predictions of father’s earnings are made based upon
other observable characteristics (e.g. their occupation and
education level). Equation 1 is then estimated using these
predictions of father’s earnings (X̂ instead of a measure that
has been directly observed (e.g. XAVG). This is often de-
scribed as an instrumental variable technique in the earnings
mobility literature (e.g. Lefranc & Trannoy, 2005; Nuñez &
Miranda, 2011), though it can alternatively be viewed as a
cold-deck imputation procedure (Nicoletti & Ermisch, 2008)
or a “generated regressor” approach (Murphy & Topel, 1985;
Wooldridge, 2002, p. 115; Inoue & Solon, 2010).
Solon (1992), Björklund and Jäntti (1997) and Nicoletti
and Ermisch (2008) consider the properties of TSTSLS es-
timates of the intergenerational elasticity (βTSTSLS). They
show that consistent estimates can be obtained if either:
• The instrumental (imputer) variables have no direct ef-
fect upon son’s earnings
• The R2 of the equation used to predict father’s earnings
equals one
Yet, as father’s education and occupation are the instru-
ments (imputer variables) usually available, it is widely
recognised that neither of these conditions hold. (Father’s
education and social class are likely to independently influ-
ence offspring’s earnings, while also not being perfect pre-
dictors of father’s permanent earnings). It is thus often stated
that βTSTSLS will be upward inconsistent as a result (Blanden,
2013).
The key issue thus becomes the magnitude of this upward
inconsistency. Is it small enough to be safely ignored, or is
it so large that TSTSLS estimates of earnings mobility be-
come problematic? Likewise, if more detail is added to the
model predicting father’s earnings, does this significantly re-
duce the upward inconsistency? Unfortunately, little is cur-
rently known about these important issues. Indeed, the only
study to quantify the inconsistency of βTSTSLS is Björklund
and Jäntti (1997). For one particular imputation model, con-
taining a specific set of predictor variables, they find upward
inconsistency of around 30 percent.
We contribute to this evidence base in multiple ways.
First, the framework of Björklund and Jäntti (1997) and
Nicoletti and Ermisch (2008) is extended from the inter-
generational elasticity to the intergenerational correlation
(ρTSTSLS). We use this to explain why ρTSTSLS is down-
ward inconsistent in our empirical analysis (i.e. in the op-
posite direction of the inconsistency of βTSTSLS). Second,
new evidence is provided on the inconsistency of βTSTSLS and
ρTSTSLS using a range of different imputer variables, and thus
the extent to which this problem can be reduced through the
use of a more detailed first-stage prediction model. Third,
we divide βTSTSLS and ρTSTSLS into components to demon-
strate what is driving their inconsistency, and show how this
changes when different prediction models are specified. Fi-
nally, we note how most studies make predictions of fa-
ther’s current earnings (XSingle), whereas permanent earnings
(XTrue) is the actual unobserved variable of interest. We ar-
gue that, in this situation, more general expressions for the
inconsistency of βTSTSLS and ρTSTSLS are needed. Our empir-
ical analysis then illustrates how conventional wisdom (e.g.
βTSTSLS always being upward inconsistent) no longer neces-
sarily holds.
The paper now proceeds as follows. Properties of TST-
SLS earnings mobility estimates are reviewed in section 2.
This is followed by an overview of the Panel Survey of In-
come Dynamics (PSID) dataset and our empirical method-
ology in section 3. Results are presented in section 4, and
conclusions in section 5.
2 TSTSLS estimates of earnings mobility
Our starting point is the framework of Nicoletti and Er-
misch (2008). As noted in the introduction, the model of
interest is:
YTrue = βXTrue + µ , (4)
with YTrue being Log son’s permanent earnings, and XTrue be-
ing Log father’s permanent earnings.
XTrue is unobserved in the “main” dataset, but it does con-
tain additional characteristics (Z), such as father’s education
and occupation, likely to be associated with XTrue.
Now say a second “auxiliary” sample (i) contains a mea-
sure of respondents’ permanent earnings2 (ii) is drawn from
1Although five consecutive years of father’s earnings is often
used (Björklund & Chadwick, 2003; Corak & Heisz, 1999; Hus-
sain, Munk, & Bonke, 2009; Solon, 1992; Vogel, 2008), more than
ten may be needed if there is substantial auto-correlation in the tran-
sitory component of earnings over time (Björklund & Jäntti, 2009;
B. Mazumder, 2005). For recent evidence see (Nybom & Stuhler,
2016).
2Time-average earnings would be the preferred measure within
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the same population and (iii) contains the same Z variables.
The following OLS regression model can be estimated:
XTrue = δZ + v (5)
where Z are the instrumental (imputer) variables.
And then used to predict log permanent father’s earnings:
X̂ = δ̂ · Z (6)
where X̂ is the predicted log father’s permanent earnings, and
δ̂ are the estimated regression coefficients from the first-stage
prediction model.
Hence (7) can now be estimated rather than (1):
YTrue = βX̂ + u (7)
Estimates of βTSTSLS and ρTSTSLS then follow from equations
2 and 3 (substituting X̂ for X).
The two most commonly used Z variables are father’s ed-
ucation and occupation (see Appendix A). However, both are
likely to directly influence son’s earnings (i.e. they are likely
to be endogenous). Consequently, son’s log earnings will
actually be given by:
YTrue = λ1XTrue + λ2X̂ + u (8)
With λ1 being the direct impact of the father’s actual per-
manent earnings on son’s earnings and λ2 the effect of fa-
ther’s predicted earnings on son’s earnings. (From this point
forward, we drop the “True” subscript for notational conve-
nience). Building upon the work of Solon (1992), Björklund
and Jäntti (1997) argue that βTSTSLS thus converges in proba-
bility to:
plim βTSTSLS = λ1 + λ2
σX̂
ησX
= β + λ2σX̂
(1 − η2)
ησX
, (9)
where σX̂ is the standard deviation of father’s predicted earn-
ings and σX is the standard deviation of father’s actual long-
run earnings. η is defined as
η =
σX̂,X
σX̂ σX
where σX̂,X is the covariance between predicted and actual
log father’s earnings.
Under the assumption that the limit of the covariance be-
tween predicted and actual log father’s earnings is asymp-
totically equal to the covariance between predicted father’s
earnings and itself:
σX̂,X = σX̂,X̂ (10)
η becomes:3
η =
σX̂,X
σX̂ σX
=
σX̂,X̂
σX̂ σX
=
σX̂
2
σX̂ σX
=
σX̂
σX
= R (11)
where R is the square root of the variance explained (R2) in
the first-stage prediction model (i.e. of equation 5).
The probability limit of βTSTSLS then becomes:
βTSTSLS = β + λ2σX̂
(
1 − σX̂ 2
σX 2
)
σX̂
σX
σX
= β + λ2σX̂
(
1 − σX̂ 2
σX 2
)
σX̂
= β + λ2
1 − σX̂2
σX2

= β + λ2(1 − R2) (12)
With the inconsistency of βTSTSLS therefore:
λ2(1 − R2) (13)
There are a number of important points to note about (11),
(12) and (13). First, as 0≤R2≤1, the variance of father’s pre-
dicted earnings must be less than or equal to the variance of
actual father’s earnings:
0 ≤ σ2
X̂
≤ σ2X
Second, if the variance of father’s predicted earnings
(σX̂
2) were equal to the variance of father’s actual earnings
(σX2), then R2 = 1 and the inconsistency of βTSTSLS re-
duces to zero. Hence, in this framework, the inconsistency
of βTSTSLS is driven by incorrect estimation of the variability
in father’s predicted earnings. Third, if the Z variables are in-
deed exogenous with respect to son’s earnings, then λ2 equals
0, and βTSTSLS is consistent. However, if parental education
and occupation are the Z chosen, λ2 will almost certainly
be positive (λ2 > 0). Thus, under the reasonable assump-
tion that λ2 > 0, and given R2≤1, βTSTSLS will be upwardly
inconsistent. Fourth, if everything else remains unchanged,
the magnitude of this upward inconsistency will decrease as
the variance explained in the first-stage prediction equation
increases. Or, to put this another way, the upward incon-
sistency will decrease as the variance of father’s predicted
earnings tends towards the variance of father’s actual earn-
ings (σX̂
2 → σX2). Fifth, it is important to recognise, how-
ever, that including additional variables to increase the R2
of the first-stage prediction equation may simultaneously in-
fluence λ2. Consequently, adding a particularly endogenous
Z variable could increase λ2 to such an extent that it more
the auxiliary dataset. Unfortunately, this is rarely available, so cur-
rent earnings are often used as the “first-stage” dependent variable
instead. We illustrate how this influences TSTSLS estimates in sec-
tion 4.
3The covariance between a variable and itself is asymptotically
equal to the variance of that variable. Hence σX̂,X̂ becomes σX̂
2.
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than offsets the benefits of any change to the first-stage R2.
Whether adding variables to the prediction equation reduces
the inconsistency of βTSTSLS is therefore an (underexplored)
empirical issue, representing a gap in the literature that this
paper attempts to fill.
Next, we extend the framework of Björklund and Jäntti
(1997) and Nicoletti and Ermisch (2008) to the intergenera-
tional correlation (ρTSTSLS). If one could observe XTrue and
YTrue, ρ would simply be:
ρ = β
σX
σY
(14)
Replacing σX with σX̂ , and β with βTSTSLS, ρTSTSLS con-
verges in probability to
plim ρTSTSLS = βTSTSLS
σX̂
σY
=
[
β + λ2(1 − R2)
] σX̂
σY
= β
σX̂
σY
+ λ2
σX̂
σY
(1 − R2) (15)
The inconsistency of ρTSTSLS is then given by (15) − (14):[
β
σX̂
σY
+ λ2
σX̂
σY
(1 − R2)
]
− βσX
σY
= β
[
σX̂
σY
− σX
σY
]
+ λ2
σX̂
σY
(1 − R2) (16)
Now define A as the left-hand side of (16) and B as the
right-hand side:
A = β
[
σX̂
σY
− σX
σY
]
(17)
B = λ2
σX̂
σY
(1 − R2) (18)
Under the previously stated assumption that σX̂
2≤σX2,
then A ≤ 0 (i.e. this will lead to downward inconsistency in
ρTSTSLS). In contrast, assuming that λ2 > 0 then, as R2 ≤ 1,
B ≥ 0 (i.e. this will lead to upward inconsistency in ρTSTSLS).
Therefore, unlike βTSTSLS, one does not know the direction of
the inconsistency in ρTSTSLS. Rather, it depends upon the rel-
ative magnitudes of A and B. This is again an empirical issue,
which we provide the first evidence upon in our analysis.
The derivations presented above have all relied upon the
following assumptions:
• The main and auxiliary datasets are random samples
from the same population
• The Z variables are independent and identically dis-
tributed across the two datasets
• That XTrue is the first-stage dependent variable, and it is
this quantity that we wish to impute into the main dataset.
To meet these assumptions, it would be ideal for the main
and auxiliary datasets to be identical (with the exception, of
course, that the former does not include XTrue). In this situa-
tion, the consistency of βTSTSLS and ρTSTSLS is driven solely
by the choice of imputer variables (Z) as set out above.
In reality, these assumptions may not be met. For instance,
Björklund and Jäntti (1997) note it is common for respon-
dents to report their own education and occupation (Z) in the
auxiliary dataset, but for offspring’s proxy reports of their fa-
ther’s characteristics to be available in the main dataset. The
impact this has upon the consistency of βTSTSLS and ρTSTSLS
will depend upon the nature and extent of this measurement
error. We therefore also consider this issue in our empirical
analysis.
Moreover, there is the additional complication of how fa-
ther’s earnings are measured in the auxiliary dataset. Return-
ing to equation (5), it has thus far been implicitly assumed
that XTrue (permanent father’s earnings) is available within
the auxiliary dataset. Yet, in practise, this is almost never the
case. Rather, researchers typically have access to data for a
cross-section of adults whose earnings are recorded for one
particular year (XSingle). A common choice is a labour force
survey, for example. Therefore the prediction model is often
specified as (19) rather than (5):
XSingle = δZ + γA + v (19)
where XSingle is earnings in a single year for a cross-section
of adults, Z are the imputation variables, and A are the age
group dummy variables.
Estimates from (19) are then used to generate predictions
of father’s earnings in the main dataset instead of equation
(6), with age set to around 40.4
X̂Single = δ̂Z + γ̂ · age40 (20)
Yet little is known about the consistency of TSTSLS esti-
mates in such situations, where the first-stage dependent vari-
able (XSingle) differs from the unobserved construct of interest
(XTrue). Indeed, this issue was not explicitly considered by
Björklund and Jäntti (1997) or Nicoletti and Ermisch (2008),
and should not be assumed to be an innocuous change to the
framework presented above. Moreover, our reading of the
literature is that almost all existing income mobility studies
applying the TSTSLS estimator use XSingle as the first-stage
dependent variable rather than XTrue.
We illustrate this point with an example. First, suppose
that Xtrue is contained within the auxiliary dataset, along with
a sufficiently rich set of Z so that the first-stage R2 equals one.
4We have chosen age 40 as this is the approximate point when
earnings peak. However, we note recent work by Nybom and Stuh-
ler (2016) who suggest that although “lifecycle bias is smallest
when incomes are measured around midlife”’ is its very difficult
to “predict the ideal age of measurement”.
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Consequently, X̂ will be identical to XTrue, thus resulting in
consistent estimates of βTSTSLS and ρTSTSLS (e.g. recall equa-
tion 13). Now consider the same scenario, but where XSingle
is the first-stage dependent variable. A first-stage R2 of one
would imply that X̂ = XSingle, resulting in rather different esti-
mates of βTSTSLS and ρTSTSLS (i.e. it is well established in the
literature that XSingle,XTrue – see Solon, 1992 and Blanden,
2013. Specifically, the use of XSingle would lead to down-
wardly inconsistent estimates of βTSTSLS and ρTSTSLS. This
highlights how the corollaries presented within the frame-
work above (e.g. βTSTSLS always being upward inconsistent)
do not necessarily hold when the first-stage variable being
imputed (XSingle) differs from the construct actually of inter-
est (XTrue).
More general expressions for the inconsistency of βTSTSLS
and ρTSTSLS are therefore required, which hold whether ei-
ther XSingle or Xtrue are used as the first-stage dependent vari-
able. First, consistent estimates of βOLS from equation (1)
converge in probability to:
plim β =
σX,Y
σ2X
(21)
Under TSTSLS, as X is unavailable, X̂ enters in its place:
plim βTSTSLS =
σX̂,Y
σ2
X̂
(22)
The inconsistency of βTSTSLS is now given by (22) minus
(21):
σX̂,Y
σX̂
2 −
σX,Y
σX2
(23)
Note that, in this more general framework, βTSTSLS can
be either upwards or downwards inconsistent. Indeed, the
direction and magnitude of the inconsistency depends upon
one’s ability to correctly estimate the ratio of the covariance
between father’s and son’s earnings (σX,Y ) to the variance of
father’s earnings (σX2).
Equations (24) to (26) provide analogous expressions for
ρTSTSLS. If Xtrue and Ytrue were available in the main dataset,
ρ could be consistently estimated by:
plim ρ =
σX,Y
σ2X
· σX
σY
=
σX,Y
σXσY
(24)
Replacing, X with X̂, ρTSTSLS converges in probability to:
plim ρTSTSLS =
σX̂,Y
σ2
X̂
· σX̂
σY
=
σX̂,Y
σX̂ σY
(25)
with the inconsistency of ρTSTSLS now given by (25) minus
(24):
σX̂,Y
σX̂ σY
− σX,Y
σXσY
(26)
In our empirical analysis we illustrate how the inconsistency
of βTSTSLS and ρTSTSLS can vary depending on whether XAvg
(as a measure of XTrue) or XSingle is used as the first-stage
dependent variable.
To conclude, we note that generated regressors (e.g. X̂)
are also subject to sampling variation. Consequently, second
stage standard errors will be underestimated unless this ad-
ditional uncertainty is taken into account. Murphy and Topel
(1985), Wooldridge (2002) and Inoue and Solon (2010) pro-
vide formulae to make an appropriate adjustment to the es-
timated standard errors, while Björklund and Jäntti (1997),
Inoue and Solon (2010) and Piraino (2014) suggest boot-
strapping as a viable (if computer intensive) alternative. We
do not dwell on this issue in this paper, and focus upon the
inconsistency of TSTSLS point estimates. Nevertheless, this
additional source of sampling uncertainty should also always
be taken into account when applying such generated regres-
sor techniques.
3 Data
The Panel Survey of Income Dynamics (PSID) is a na-
tionally representative sample of US households, with the
data available for download from http://simba.isr.umich.edu/
default.aspx. It began in 1968, with annual follow-ups to
1997, and bi-annual interviews thereafter. Detailed informa-
tion has been collected at each sweep from the household
head and their partner. Offspring are tracked as they leave the
initially sampled household. Consequently, the PSID con-
tains earnings information across multiple years for both fa-
thers and sons. Throughout our analysis we restrict the sam-
ple to include sons who were household heads aged between
30 and 60 in 2011, and who reported their earnings for the
previous year. Moreover, we only include sons whose father
can be identified, has reported annual earnings on at least five
occasions during their prime working years (between ages
30 and 60), and where both parent and offspring reports of
father’s education, occupation and industry are available.
After making these restrictions, our working sample
equals 1,024 observations. Approximately 80 percent of
these individuals have at least 15 reports of father’s annual
earnings available, with 60 percent having 20 or more. A
“permanent” measure of father’s earnings is created by av-
eraging across all available reports for each sample mem-
ber. We call this XAVG, the closest measure to XTrue available
in the PSID. All earnings data have been adjusted to 2010
prices.
As part of each PSID sweep, fathers were asked detailed
questions about their educational attainment, occupation and
industry (we label father’s reports of these variables as ZFA.
Education has been recorded using the highest grade ever
completed, which we have converted into eight groups. Oc-
cupation and industry have been recorded using three digit
census codes. These are finely defined categories – sep-
arating occupations and industries into approximately 200
groups. We use this detailed information on father’s oc-
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cupation and industry (taken from the year their offspring
turned age 15) as the key imputer variables (Z)5. At times,
we also use more broadly defined “1 digit” occupation (10
categories) and industry (12 categories) groups.
Sons also reported similar information about their father’s
education, occupation and industry (denoted ZSons). For in-
stance, in the 2011 sweep, sons were asked:
• How much education did your father complete?
• What was your father’s usual occupation when you
were growing up?
• What kind of business or industry was that in?
Information on Z is thus available both directly from fa-
thers (ZFathers) and indirectly via their sons (ZSons). We ex-
ploit this in the following section to examine the robustness
of TSTSLS mobility estimates to who reports the Z charac-
teristics.
3.1 Creating an auxiliary dataset
The 1,024 PSID observations described above form our
“main” dataset (PSID-MAIN). To create an auxiliary dataset,
we sample with replacement from these individuals. This
generates an auxiliary sample containing 500,000 observa-
tions. (Henceforth PSID-AUX). The intuition behind this
approach is similar to creating a single bootstrap re-sample.
(Indeed, if we were to create an auxiliary dataset of size
1,024, this would be equivalent to us taking a single bootstrap
re-sample). Specifically, by randomly re-sampling from
PSID-MAIN, we create a second random draw of individuals
who belong to the same population. This approach has three
important advantages. First, one can guarantee that the main
and auxiliary datasets are drawn from the same population.
Second, the main and auxiliary datasets contain exactly the
same variables measured in exactly the same way. Third, the
size of the auxiliary dataset is under our control.
This method for generating the auxiliary dataset differs
from the standard procedure used in the literature, where
two completely different datasets are typically used for the
“auxiliary” and “main” samples. Our justification for fol-
lowing this different approach is that this standard proce-
dure used in the literature actually suffers from two prob-
lems (i) the potential inconsistency in the TSTSLS estimator
and (ii) whether the main and auxiliary datasets chosen are
truly comparable (e.g. do they represent the same population,
define variables in the same way, both have high response
rates). The focus of this paper is point (i) – the inconsis-
tency in the TSTSLS estimator. We therefore want to abstract
from point (ii) – the potential additional difficulty of finding
two truly comparable datasets. Our method of generating
the auxiliary dataset allows us to achieve this important goal,
allowing us to rule out non-comparability of data as an expla-
nation for our results. Nevertheless, appreciating that this is
a somewhat different approach, section 4.4 describes how we
have investigated the robustness of our results to generating
the auxiliary dataset in a different way.
We exploit this important advantage to produce TSTSLS
mobility estimates under “ideal conditions” (i.e. large aux-
iliary dataset, identical measurement of key variables across
datasets, samples drawn from the same population). This en-
ables us to investigate the consistency of βTSTSLS and ρTSTSLS
under different choices of the Z (imputer) variables. We then
add additional complicating factors into the analysis (e.g.
measurement of Z differing across datasets) to investigate the
robustness of TSTSLS estimates to some of the other chal-
lenges researchers face.
3.2 Methodology
PSID-AUX is used to impute father’s earnings (X̂) into
PSID-MAIN following the TSTSLS approach. The twist,
of course, is that PSID-MAIN also contains an actual ob-
served measure of father’s long-run earnings (XAVG). One
can therefore investigate how intergenerational mobility es-
timates change when using X̂ to measure father’s earnings
rather than XAVG.
The first-stage prediction model, estimated using PSID-
AUX, takes the form:
XAVG = α + γZFathers + u (27)
with XAVG being father’s observed time-average earnings,
and ZFathers being father’s reports of the imputer variables.
The key decision is then which variables to include in
ZFathers. Appendix A provides an overview of those typically
used in the literature. There are four common choices:
1. broad education level – e.g. Dunn (2007)
2. broad education and broad occupation – e.g. Björklund
and Jäntti (1997)
3. broad education, occupation and industry – e.g. Piraino
(2007)
4. broad education and detailed (3 digit) occupation – e.g.
Leigh (2007)
This guides the combination of Z used in this paper. Table
1 illustrates the variables we include in five different first-
stage model specifications (henceforth M1 to M5).
These are used to impute father’s earnings (X̂) into PSID-
MAIN:
X̂ = α̂ + γ̂ ZFathers (28)
The following regression model is then estimated six times
within PSID-MAIN – once using XAVG to measure father’s
5We have also created a “modal” value for father’s occupation
and industry. This is where we take the most often reported occu-
pation and industry of the father when their offspring were growing
up. Approximately 75 percent of observations remain within the
same occupation and industry category, regardless of whether the
age 15 or modal category is used. Likewise, both variables show
similar levels of consistency with sons’ reports of this information.
TWO-SAMPLE TWO-STAGE LEAST SQUARES (TSTSLS) ESTIMATES OF EARNINGS MOBILITY: HOW CONSISTENT ARE THEY? 91
Table 1
he imputer (Z) variables used in the first-stage predic-
tion models
Variable M1 M2 M3 M4 M5
Race 3 3 3 3 3
Education 3 3 3 3 3
Occupation (1 digit) 7 3 3 7 7
Occupation (3 digit) 7 7 7 3 3
Industry (1 digit) 7 7 3 3 7
Industry (3 digit) 7 7 7 7 3
M1 to M5 refers to the five different specifications of the first
stage prediction model. All variables refer to characteristics
of PSID fathers.
earnings and five times using the different predictions of X̂ :
Y2010 = α + βX + ε (29)
where Y2010 are the log annual earnings of sons in 2010, and
X are father’s earnings (measured using either XAVG or X̂)
We then compare estimates of βTSTSLS and ρTSTSLS (ob-
tained using X̂) to βOLS and ρOLS (obtained using XAVG).
In our main analysis, son’s earnings (Y) are taken from a
single year (2010), when they are aged between 30 and 60.
Ideally, to minimize the impact of “life-cycle bias” (Haider &
Solon, 2006), a tighter age restriction would have been used
(e.g. 35 to 45 year old sons only)6. Unfortunately, making
such a restriction here would result in a significant reduction
in sample size. We nevertheless appreciate the importance
of life-cycle bias, and have hence investigated the sensitivity
of our results to using a five-year average of son’s earnings,
with further details provided in section 4.4.
4 Results
This section presents results from our empirical analysis
of the PSID. Sub-section 4.1 focuses upon the choice of the
instrumental (imputer) variables. Sub-section 4.2 turns to the
issue of who reports the information on these Z characteris-
tics (fathers or their sons). Finally, sub-section 4.3 considers
the impact of how earnings are measured within the auxiliary
dataset.
4.1 The choice of instrumental (imputer) variables
Table 2 compares estimates of βTSTSLS and ρTSTSLS to βOLS
and ρOLS. Whereas βOLS stands at 0.5707, TSTSLS estimate
M1 equals 0.751, M2 equals 0.770 and M3 0.716. βTSTSLS
is thus upward inconsistent by approximately 30 percent.
βTSTSLS declines under M4 and M5 (≈0.65) though the up-
ward inconsistency remains non-trivial (15 percent).
To provide further insight into these results, Table 3 panel
A presents the components of the inconsistency of βTSTSLS,
Table 2
Estimates of the intergenerational elasticity (β) and
correlation (ρ) using different TSTSLS imputation
models
TSTSLS First-stage Elasticity Correlation
model R2 βTSTSLS ρTSTSLS
M1 0.388 0.751 0.261
M2 0.466 0.770 0.293
M3 0.489 0.716 0.279
M4 0.660 0.643 0.291
M5 0.743 0.644 0.310
OLS - 0.570 0.318
Authors’ calculations using the PSID dataset. Sample re-
stricted to the same 1,024 individuals across all specifi-
cation. SE stands for standard error. M1 to M5 indicate
which first-stage TSTSLS imputation model has been used
(see Table 1). Estimates using observed time-average fa-
ther’s earnings (OLS) reported in the bottom row.
corresponding to equations (9) to (12) in section 2. For exam-
ple, why is the upward inconsistency of βTSTSLS not reduced
between M1 and M2, despite the notable increase in the first-
stage R2? Table 3 illustrates that the addition of father’s oc-
cupation (M2) also influences the direct effect of predicted
father’s earnings on son’s earnings (λ2); it increases from
0.30 to 0.38 as the R2 moves from 0.39 to 0.46. In terms of
consistency, losses due to the former are not offset by gains
from the latter. Consequently, the upward inconsistency of
βTSTSLS increases from 0.181 to 0.200. This illustrates how
simply choosing the instruments in order for the R2 of the
first-stage regression be as high as possible will not necessar-
ily reduce the inconsistency of βTSTSLS. Indeed, the addition
of variables which influence λ2 as well as the first-stage R2
can actually do more harm than good.
Table 3 Panel A also reveals that two factors drive the big
reduction in the inconsistency between M3 and M4. The first
is the large increase in the standard deviation of father’s pre-
6Böhlmark and Lindquist (2006) suggest lifecycle bias is ap-
proximately zero when sons are age 38 in the United States. How-
ever, Nybom and Stuhler (2016) suggest that putting a precise age
on when life-cycle bias is minimised is not possible.
7Using a five-year average of father’s earnings, Solon (1992)
and Björklund and Jäntti (1997) estimate βOLS to be approximately
0.40. However, B. Mazumder (2005) argues that a five-year aver-
age of father’s earnings may be insufficient to eliminate problems of
measurement error and transitory fluctuations. These estimates may
therefore be downward inconsistent. Indeed, Mazumder obtains
substantially higher values of βOLS (0.61) when averaging father’s
earnings over 16 years. The fact that we obtain a higher estimate of
βOLS (0.56) than Solon and Bjorklund and JÃd’ntti is therefore likely
to be due to father’s earnings having been averaged over more than
20 years (see Table 1).
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Table 3
Estimates of the inconsistency of TSTSLS earnings mobility estimates
M1 M2 M4 M5 M6
(a) Elasticity
λ2 0.300 0.377 0.288 0.221 0.295
σXˆ 0.346 0.379 0.388 0.451 0.479
σX 0.554 0.554 0.554 0.554 0.554
βXˆ.X 0.119 0.143 0.150 0.203 0.228
R2 0.386 0.464 0.486 0.657 0.742
βOLS 0.570 0.570 0.570 0.570 0.570
βTSTSLS 0.751 0.770 0.716 0.644 0.644
Inconsistency 0.181 0.200 0.146 0.074 0.074
(b) Correlation
βOLS 0.570 0.570 0.570 0.570 0.570
σXˆ 0.346 0.379 0.388 0.451 0.479
σX 0.554 0.554 0.554 0.554 0.554
σY 0.995 0.995 0.995 0.995 0.995
Inconsistency part A −0.119 −0.100 −0.095 −0.059 −0.043
λ2 0.300 0.377 0.288 0.221 0.295
σXˆ 0.346 0.379 0.388 0.451 0.479
σX 0.995 0.995 0.995 0.995 0.995
R2 0.386 0.464 0.486 0.657 0.742
Inconsistency part B 0.064 0.077 0.058 0.034 0.037
ρOLS 0.317 0.317 0.317 0.317 0.317
ρTSTSLS 0.261 0.293 0.279 0.292 0.310
Inconsistency −0.055 −0.023 −0.037 −0.025 −0.007
Authors’ calculations using the PSID dataset. M1 to M5 refer to the TSTSLS imputation model
specification used (see Table 1). See equation (11) and (12) for the components of the intergenera-
tional elasticity and equations (16) to (18) for the components of the intergenerational correlation.
dicted earnings (σX̂) from 0.388 to 0.451. This, via equation
(11), substantially increases the first-stage R2. The second
is the decrease in λ2, which falls from 0.29 to 0.22. Why is
there then no further reduction of the inconsistency between
M4 and M5? Table 3 reveals that although σX̂ (and thus R
2)
increase, λ2 approximately returns back to its level under M3
(0.29). The effect of the former cancels out the latter, mean-
ing no net gain regarding the consistency of βTSTSLS.
Returning to Table 2, ρOLS equals is 0.318. The TSTSLS
M1 estimate is 0.261; downward inconsistency of approxi-
mately 18 percent. However ρTSTSLS increases as additional
ZFathers variables are added to the prediction model, with the
downward inconsistency standing at 12 percent using M3
(ρTSTSLS = 0.279), and essentially zero using M5 (ρTSTSLS
= 0.310). The inconsistency of ρTSTSLS therefore tends to
be (a) in the opposite direction (b) smaller in magnitude and
(c) less sensitive to the combination of the Z variables than
the inconsistency of βTSTSLS. Indeed, Table 2 illustrates how
ρTSTSLS is not usually too far from ρOLS . This is important
given that, of the near 30 studies applying TSTSLS reviewed
in Appendix A, only Björklund and Jäntti (1997) report the
intergenerational correlation.
Table 3 Panel B splits the inconsistency of ρTSTSLS into
two components: part A (corresponding to equation 17) and
part B (corresponding to equation 18). Recall how the for-
mer induces downward inconsistency in ρTSTSLS, while the
latter leads to upward inconsistency. It becomes clear that
the comparatively small inconsistency of ρTSTSLS (relative to
the inconsistency of βTSTSLS) is due to these two components
partially cancelling one another out. However, the downward
pressure induced by part A is always slightly greater than the
upward pressure from part B, leading to the overall down-
ward inconsistency of ρTSTSLS.
What happens as additional variables are added to the pre-
diction model? First, the downward pressure induced by part
A is always reduced. This is because the standard deviation
of father’s predicted earnings (σX̂) is the only term within
equation A that changes (see equation 17), and can only in-
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Table 4
TSTSLS estimates of the intergenerational correla-
tion and elasticity when son’s reports of father’s Z
characteristics
βTSTSLS ρTSTSLS
Father’s Son’s Father’s Son’s
reports reports reports reports
ZFathers ZSons ZFathers ZSons
M1 0.751 0.796 0.261 0.266
M2 0.770 0.824 0.293 0.283
M3 0.716 0.772 0.279 0.281
M4 0.644 0.686 0.292 0.276
M5 0.644 0.661 0.310 0.293
OLS 0.570 0.318
Authors’ calculations using the PSID dataset. Sample re-
stricted to the same 1,024 individuals across all specifica-
tion. Table illustrates how βTSTSLS and ρTSTSLS differ when
using son’s reports (ZSons) of their father’s characteristics
(e.g. education, occupation and industry) rather than us-
ing father’s own reports (ZFathers). M1 to M5 refer to the
specification of the TSTSLS imputation model used (see
Table 1). Estimates using observed time-average father’s
earnings (OLS) reported in the bottom row.
crease towards the “true” value (σX) as variables are added
to the prediction model. In contrast, part B includes (σX̂
σY
) and
(1−R2), with a greater value of σX̂ increasing the former but
decreasing the latter. Moreover, λ2 is also found in compo-
nent B, which fluctuates in value between M1 and M5. Thus,
whereas adding information to the prediction model clearly
reduces the inconsistency induced by part A, the influence
on part B is hard to predict. Our empirical analysis does sug-
gest, however, that gains from the former more than offset
any losses from the latter. Consequently, the inconsistency
of ρTSTSLS does generally decline when information is added
to the first-stage prediction model.
4.2 Measurement of imputer variables (Z)
The above investigation took place under “ideal condi-
tions”, with identical measurement of key variables across
main and auxiliary datasets. We now investigate the impact
of the imputer variables being measured using son’s recall of
their father’s characteristics (ZSons in the main dataset, while
individuals own reports are used within the auxiliary dataset
(ZFathers).
First, we investigate the uniformity of parent (ZFathers) and
offspring (ZSons) reports of father’s education, occupation and
industry. This investiagtion includes the percentage of occa-
sions where father’s and son’s report the same category (“per-
centage correct”) and Kappa statistics of inter-rater reliability
(a statistic which adjusts for agreement occurring by chance).
Kappa statistics range from −1 (complete disagreement) to
+1 (complete agreement) with Landis and Koch (1977) pro-
viding the following rules of thumb:
• 0–0.20 “Slight” agreement (between parent and child
reports)
• 0.21–0.40 “fair” agreement
• 0.41–0.60 “moderate” agreement
• 0.61–0.80 “substantial” agreement
• 0.81–0.99 “almost perfect” agreement
We find that fathers and sons report the same education
and industry on more than 60 percent of occasions. Kappa
statistics (0.52 and 0.55) are towards the top end of Lan-
dis and Koch’s “moderate” agreement category, with “sub-
stantial agreement” when weighted Kappa is used (0.72 and
0.67). (Weighted Kappa is where categories further apart are
considered to show greater levels of disagreement than cate-
gories closer together). In contrast, just 27 percent of father’s
and son’s report the same category for father’s occupation,
with Kappa statistics suggesting agreement is “slight” (0.16)
to “fair” (0.28). One potential explanation is sons were asked
about their father’s occupation at a vague time point (‘what
was your father’s occupation when you were growing up?’)
which we have compared to the job father’s reported hold-
ing when sons were age 15. Consequently, we are unable
to establish whether this lack of agreement is due to son’s
inability to accurately recall their father’s occupation, or dif-
ferent interpretation of the questions asked (e.g. son’s recall-
ing their father’s occupation at a different age). Moreover,
the PSID data suffers difficulties with different occupational
coding schemas used across different sweeps, which may in-
troduce a degree of uncertainty into the analysis.
Table 4 illustrates how switching to offspring reports of
the imputer variables (ZSons) influences estimates of βTSTSLS
and ρTSTSLS. Overall, this has relatively little impact upon
our results. For instance, βTSTSLS (ρTSTSLS) is estimated to
be 0.770 (0.293) when using imputation model M2 and fa-
ther’s reports (ZFathers. This changes to 0.824 (0.283) when
using son’s reports instead (ZSons). Similarly, under imputa-
tion model M5, estimates of βTSTSLS (ρTSTSLS) stand at 0.644
(0.301) using father’s reports, and 0.661 (0.293) using son’s
reports. Differences are therefore usually quite small, though
on certain occasions are non-trivial. Nevertheless, our em-
pirical analysis overall suggests that TSTSLS estimates are
fairly robust to this particular measurement issue.
4.3 Imputation of current versus time-average father’s
earnings
Does changing the first-stage dependent variable from
XAvg to XSingle influence βTSTSLS or ρTSTSLS? Table 5 provides
results, with XSingle measured using father’s earnings in 1980
(or the closest available year).
Key findings remain largely unaltered under M1, M2 and
M3; large upward inconsistency in βTSTSLS remains, with
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Table 5
TSTSLS estimates of the intergenerational correla-
tion and elasticity when son’s reports of father’s Z
characteristics
βTSTSLS ρTSTSLS
XSingle XAVG XSingle XAVG
M1 0.751 0.794 0.264 0.252
M2 0.770 0.737 0.293 0.278
M3 0.716 0.665 0.279 0.260
M4 0.644 0.479 0.292 0.230
M5 0.644 0.413 0.310 0.231
OLS 0.570 0.318
Authors’ calculations using the PSID dataset. Sample re-
stricted to the same 1,024 individuals across all specifica-
tion. XAVG where time-average father’s earnings is the de-
pendent variable in the first stage imputation model (i.e.
“ideal conditions”). XSingle where father’s 1980 earnings is
the dependent variable in the first stage imputation model.
M1 to M5 refer to the specification of the TSTSLS impu-
tation model used (see Table 1).
slight downward inconsistency in ρTSTSLS. However, βTSTSLS
is now much smaller under M4 and M5. For instance, under
M5 βTSTSLS was 0.644 when using XAVG (upward inconsis-
tency of 15 percent). But, after changing the first-stage de-
pendent variable to XSingle, βTSTSLS falls to 0.413 (downward
inconsistency of 25 percent). Similarly, ρTSTSLS using M5 is
now 0.231 (downward inconsistency of 25 percent) having
previously stood at 0.310 (downward inconsistency of one
percent).
Table 6 breaks these TSTSLS estimates down into their
respective components (corresponding to equation 22 for
βTSTSLS and equation 25 for ρTSTSLS). To begin, the covari-
ance between father’s and son’s earnings (i.e. the common
numerator of βTSTSLS and ρTSTSLS) is similar – although al-
ways marginally smaller – using XSingle. For instance, σx̂,y
under M3 falls from 0.108 using XAVG to 0.101 using XSingle.
Likewise, under M1, M2 and M3, the variance of predicted
father’s earnings (σx̂2) does not seem sensitive to the choice
of the first-stage dependent variable (e.g. for M3, σx̂2 is
0.151 using XAVG and 0.152 using XSingle). Consequently,
none of the key components of βTSTSLS or ρTSTSLS are partic-
ularly influenced by the use of XSingle rather than XAVG when
the first-stage prediction model is relatively sparse. Hence
estimates of βTSTSLS and ρTSTSLS are similar whichever earn-
ings measure (XAVG or XSingle) is used.
The same does not hold true, however, under M4 and
M5. Specifically, the variance of father’s earnings (σx̂2)
is significantly bigger when the first-stage dependent vari-
able is XSingle. In contrast, the covariance between father’s
predicted earnings and son’s earnings tends to be slightly
smaller. Using M5 as an example, σx̂2 rises from 0.229
(XAVG) to 0.308 (XSingle, while σx̂,y falls from 0.148 (XAVG)
to 0.127 (XSingle). Thus, while the denominator of βTSTSLS
(σx̂2) has substantially increased (and is now almost iden-
tical to the denominator of βOLS) the numerator (σx̂,y) has
slightly decreased (and remains around 25 percent below the
numerator of βOLS). This causes βTSTSLS to become down-
wardly inconsistent. Whether one uses XAVG or XSingle as the
first-stage dependent variable therefore seems to have much
more influence upon the key components of βTSTSLS when a
detailed set of Z characteristics are included in the first-stage
prediction model.
Building upon the intuition above, the standard deviation
of father’s predicted earnings (σx̂) also enters the denomina-
tor of ρTSTSLS. The increase in σx̂ from using XSingle as the
first-stage dependent variable (as opposed to XAVG) therefore
also puts downward pressure on ρTSTSLS. (The impact is less
pronounced than for βTSTSLS due to the standard deviation
of father’s predicted earnings being the key term rather than
the variance). Indeed, when using XSingle , ρTSTSLS actually
moves further away from ρOLS as Z variables are added to
the first-stage prediction model. For instance, the TSTSLS
M2 estimate of rho = 0.278 is much closer to the OLS value
(0.317) than the estimate obtained under M5 (0.230). In other
words, the inconsistency of ρTSTSLS has increased in abso-
lute magnitude, driven by the greater variability in father’s
predicted earnings. This is in direct contrast to results us-
ing XAVG (presented on the left hand side of Table 6) where
adding Z variables to the prediction model almost typically
brought ρTSTSLS and ρOLS closer together (i.e. decreased the
inconsistency).
These results have important implications. First, changing
the first-stage dependent variable can lead to rather different
estimates of earnings mobility. Second, it is only safe to as-
sume βTSTSLS is upward inconsistent if XTrue is the first-stage
dependent variable (i.e. the earnings measure being imputed
into the main dataset). Third, this strengthens the empirical
evidence that TSTSLS estimates of the intergenerational cor-
relation are typically downward inconsistent. Finally, even
subtle changes to the imputation model can make important
differences to βTSTSLS and ρTSTSLS.
4.4 Robustness tests
We have investigated the robustness of results in two
ways. First, we have considered how our estimates change
when using a different methodology to produce the “auxil-
iary” dataset. Specifically, we randomly divide our sample
of 1,024 PSID observations into two equal groups. The first
set of 512 observations are then designated as the “main”
sample and the other 512 as the “auxiliary” sample. Hence
this alternative approach does not use replacement sampling
to create the auxiliary dataset. Our key findings can be sum-
marised as follows. First, we continue to find the intergener-
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Table 6
The numerator and denominator of βTSTSLS and ρTSTSLS when “current” earnings used as
the first-stage dependent variable
First-stage dependent variable = XAVG First-stage dependent variable = XSingle
σX,Y σ
2
X σX,Y σ
2
X
Coef. Value % Value % Coef. Value % Value %
(a) Intergenerational elasticity
M1 0.751 0.090 −49 0.120 −61 0.794 0.079 −55 0.100 −67
M2 0.770 0.110 −37 0.144 −53 0.737 0.104 −41 0.141 −54
M3 0.716 0.108 −38 0.151 −51 0.665 0.101 −42 0.152 −51
M4 0.644 0.131 −25 0.203 −34 0.479 0.117 −33 0.244 −20
M5 0.644 0.148 −16 0.229 −25 0.413 0.127 −27 0.308 0
OLS 0.570 0.175 - 0.307 - 0.570 0.175 - 0.307 -
(b) Intergenerational correlation
M1 0.261 0.090 −49 0.346 −38 0.252 0.079 −55 0.316 −43
M2 0.293 0.110 −37 0.379 −32 0.278 0.104 −41 0.375 −32
M3 0.279 0.108 −38 0.388 −30 0.260 0.101 −42 0.390 −30
M4 0.292 0.131 −25 0.451 −19 0.238 0.117 −33 0.494 −11
M5 0.310 0.148 −16 0.479 −14 0.230 0.127 −27 0.555 0
OLS 0.317 0.175 - 0.554 - 0.317 0.175 - 0.554 -
Authors’ calculations using the PSID dataset. M1 to M5 refer to the TSTSLS imputation model spec-
ification used (see Table 1). XAVG where time-average father’s earnings is the dependent variable in
the first stage imputation model. XSingle where father’s 1980 earnings is the dependent variable in the
first stage imputation model. “Value” presents the value of the statistic in question. “%” illustrates
percentage underestimation relative to OLS results.
ational elasticity to be overestimated under TSTSLS, while
the intergenerational correlation is slightly underestimated.
Second, there is still relatively little change to results whether
one uses parent or offspring reports of their father’s charac-
teristics. Finally, we continue to find that estimates of both
βTSTSLS and ρTSTSLS can differ, sometimes quite markedly,
depending upon the first-stage imputation model.
Second, the results presented above use information on
sons’ earnings from the 2011 PSID wave only, and could
therefore be subject to “life-cycle bias”. We have therefore
investigated how results change when using a five-year aver-
age of sons’ earnings instead. Three features of this supple-
mentary analysis stand out. First, the “preferred” estimate of
ρ̂, based upon a time-average of both father’s and son’s earn-
ings, is 0.405. This is around 20 percent higher than when
sons’ earnings are based upon the 2011 data alone. Second,
consistent with the results reported in previous sub-sections,
estimates of ρ̂ using TSTSLS to predict father’s earnings (M1
to M5) are always quite close to the value obtained under the
time-average approach (typically within 10 to 15 percent).
Finally, we continue to find β̂ to be overestimated when TST-
SLS is used to impute father’s earnings. This is consistent
with the key findings presented in previous sub-sections; β̂
tends to be substantially overestimated when using TSTSLS
– though with notable improvement as additional informa-
tion is added to the first-stage prediction model.
Further details on these additional analyses, along with the
Stata code, are available in the supplementary material (see
https://zenodo.org/record/49376#.VwfmDeTmrIU).
5 Conclusions
Intergenerational earnings mobility is a topic of great aca-
demic and policy concern. However, producing consistent
estimates of earnings mobility is not a trivial task. In many
countries earnings data cannot be linked across generations.
Consequently, several studies estimate earnings mobility us-
ing TSTSLS instead. This paper has presented new evidence
on the consistency of earnings mobility estimates based upon
this methodology.
A summary of our results can be found in Table 7. This
illustrates the sensitivity of βTSTSLS and ρTSTSLS to using dif-
ferent first-stage imputation models and measurement of key
variables. Column 1 indicates whether XSingle (1980) or XAVG
(AVG) is the first-stage dependent variable. Column 2 in-
dicates whether father’s (FA) or son’s (CH) reports of Z are
used, while column 3 provides the specification of the predic-
tion model (to be cross-referenced with Table 1). Columns 4
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Table 7
A comparison of TSTSLS estimates using different measures of key vari-
ables and different imputation model specifications
First stage de- Father/son Imputer
pendent variable report of Z variables (Z) β ρ
AVG CH M2 0.824 0.283
1980 CH M1 0.801 0.251
1980 FA M1 0.794 0.252
1980 CH M2 0.782 0.256
AVG CH M1 0.796 0.266
AVG CH M3 0.772 0.281
AVG FA M2 0.770 0.293
AVG FA M1 0.751 0.261
1980 FA M2 0.737 0.278
AVG FA M3 0.716 0.279
1980 CH M3 0.706 0.256
AVG CH M4 0.686 0.276
1980 FA M3 0.665 0.260
AVG CH M5 0.661 0.293
AVG FA M4 0.644 0.292
AVG FA M5 0.644 0.310
Time-average benchmark 0.570 0.318
1980 FA M4 0.479 0.238
1980 CH M4 0.471 0.213
1980 FA M5 0.413 0.231
1980 CH M5 0.346 0.182
Authors’ calculations using the PSID dataset. Auxiliary dataset sample size set
to 500,000 observations. “Imputer variables” refers to the Z variables used to
predict father’s earnings (see Table 1). AVG / 1980 refers to the first-stage de-
pendent variable (AVG = time-average; 1980 = single measure of father’s earn-
ings in 1980). FA/CH indicates whether father’s or son’s reports of the Z char-
acteristics used in the main dataset.
and 5 provide estimates of βTSTSLS and ρTSTSLS. The follow-
ing findings emerge:
• βTSTSLS is often (although not always) upwardly incon-
sistent.
• βTSTSLS is particularly sensitive to the choice and mea-
surement of the first stage imputation model. Estimates are
up to 50 percent upwardly inconsistent or 40 percent down-
wardly inconsistent.
• Estimates of ρTSTSLS tend to be more stable and suffer
less inconsistency.
• Although the inconsistency of ρTSTSLS can in theory be
in either direction, our empirical analysis suggests that, in
practise, they tend to be below ρOLS.
Based upon our findings, we provide the following guid-
ance to researchers wishing to estimate earnings mobility us-
ing TSTSLS. First, ρTSTSLS and βTSTSLS should both be re-
ported where possible. But, if a choice has to be made, our
empirical analysis suggests there may be reasons to prefer
the former over the latter8. Second, the auxiliary and main
datasets should contain information on educational attain-
ment and detailed (3 digit) occupation as a minimum. This
means that at least two first-stage specifications can be es-
timated – a “broad” specification (as per our model M2 or
M3) and a “detailed” specification (as per our model M4
or M5). One can then investigate how this changes esti-
mates of ρTSTSLS and βTSTSLS, including a breakdown into
their separate components (as per our Table 6). Third, the
auxiliary dataset should ideally contain information on re-
spondents’ time-average earnings (XAVG). The use of cross-
8At the same time, “classical” measurement error in son’s earn-
ings will lead to inconsistent estimates of ρ but not β (Black & De-
vereux, 2011). A key implication is that estimating the intergen-
erational correlation is therefore more demanding in terms of the
amount of information required. Counter-arguments can therefore
be made as to why one may prefer β over ρ In any case, these two
measures capture different aspects of mobility, with both provid-
ing important information. Hence both β over ρ should be reported
whenever possible.
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sectional data with respondents’ earnings reported at a sin-
gle time-point (e.g. a labour force survey) should be consid-
ered a second-best alternative. Fourth, as briefly discussed
in section 2, standard errors should be corrected to account
for the sampling variation in the predictions of father’s earn-
ings. This can be done via a Murphy-Topel correction (Mur-
phy & Topel, 1985) or appropriate application of a bootstrap
technique (Björklund & Jäntti, 1997; Inoue & Solon, 2010)).
Fifth, researchers should note that their estimates of earnings
mobility may differ from other studies due to methodologi-
cal rather than substantive reasons. This includes instances
where TSTSLS has been used in rather different ways (e.g.
different combinations, definitions and measurement of key
variables). Finally, we urge great care to be taken when com-
paring mobility estimates across studies – and across coun-
tries – where different methodologies have been applied.
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Table A1
Intergenerational mobility papers imputing father’s earnings using TSTSLS
Sample size Offspring’ Sample size Imputer variable
Study Country (Main data) income (Auxiliary) and 1st stage R2
Aaronson and
D. Mazumder
(2008)
United States Men, 25-54 years
old, born btw 1921
and 1975.
Earnings 1940-1970: 1% sam-
ple; 1980-2000: 5%
sample
State of birth
R2: Not reported
Andrews and
Leigh (2009)
16 countries Not reported Son’s log hourly
wage.
Not reported 192 Occupation dummies (off-spring re-
ported)
R2: Not reported
Bauer (2006) Switzerland 2,138 Average earnings
from work
41,362 Occupation (9 dummies); Education (7
dummies); Swiss citizen dummy
R2 = 0.27
Bidisha, Das,
and McFarlane
(2013)
United King-
dom
3,823 Average log wages
of full time workers
and earnings of self-
employees over the
panel
935 Education (3 dummies); Occupation (3
dummies); immigrant status; ethnic group;
professional level (4 dummies); cohort (2
dummies); Hope-Goldthrope score;
R2=0.323
Björklund and
Jäntti (1997)
Sweden and
USA
Sweden: 327
US: Not reported
Annual log earnings
and capital market
income
Sweden: 540 (US:
Not reported)
Education (2 dummies); Occupation (8
dummies); Living in Stockholm (Note:
Children reports)
R2: Not reported
Cavaglia (2014) Germany,
Italy, UK, US
Germany = 27,442
Italy = 6,860
UK = 14,363
US = 7,530
Labour income Germany = 4,534
Italy = 1,516
UK = 4,989
US = 7,918
Education, occupation and industry
R2 Germany = 0.47
R2 Italy = 0.34
R2 UK = 0.31
R2 US = 0.22
Continues on next page
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Sample size Offspring’ Sample size Imputer variable
Study Country (Main data) income (Auxiliary) and 1st stage R2
Cervini-Pla
(2015)
Spain 3,520 sons
3,995 daughters
Annual log earnings
of sons. For daugh-
ters: log family in-
come and log cou-
ples’ earnings.
5, 929 Education (6 dummies); Occupation (9
dummies).
R2: 0.40
Dunn (2007) Brazil 14,872 Annual log “earnings
from all jobs”
37,396 Father’s education (10 categories)
R2: Not reported.
Ferreira and
Veloso (2006)
Brazil 25,927 Log wages. 59,340 Father’s education (7 dummies), Father’s
occupation (6 dummies)
R2: Not reported
Fortin and Lefeb-
vre (1998)
Canada Father-son: 3,400
(1986) and 2,459
(1994)
Father-daughter:
2,474 (1986) and
2,308 (1994)
Annual income ca 500,000 each year Father’s occupation (15 groups)
R2: Not reported
Gong, Leigh, and
Meng (2012)
China 5,475 Annual log income. Varies depending on
UHIES sample.
Father’s education; Father’s occupation;
Industry.
R2: Not reported
Grawe (2004) Ecuador,
Nepal, Pak-
istan, and
Peru
Ecuador: 1,461
Nepal: 229
Pakistan: 171
Peru: 98
Total wage income Ecuador: 685
Nepal: 239
Pakistan: 441
Peru: 166
Father’s education.
Lefranc, Ojima,
and Yoshida
(2010)
France and
Japan
Japan: 987
France 13,487
Japan: Individual
primary income
(labour + assets)
before tax or transfer
France: Annual
earnings from labour.
Fathers btw 25 and
54, in Japan
Fathers btw 24 and
60 in France.
Linking variables: year of birth; 3 educa-
tional levels and occupation (Japan)
year of birth; 6 levels of education (France)
R2: N.R.
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Continued from last page
Sample size Offspring’ Sample size Imputer variable
Study Country (Main data) income (Auxiliary) and 1st stage R2
Lefranc (2011) France 29,415 Annual wages 48,245 Father’s education (6 groups); Note: Off-
spring reports
R2: Not reported
Lefranc and
Trannoy (2005)
France and
USA
1977: 2,023
1985: 2,114
1993: 771
Wages 2,364–6,488 depend-
ing on the year.
Father’s education (8 groups); Father’s oc-
cupation (7 groups); (Note: Offspring re-
ported)
R2: 0.49–0.54
Lefranc, Ojima,
and Yoshida
(2013)
Japan 2,273 Gross individual in-
come
7,170 Father education (3 groups); Father occu-
pation (8 groups) Firm size (2 groups);
Self-employment; Residential area (3
groups).
R2: 0.46
Leigh (2007) Australia 1965: 946
1973: 1,871
1987: 243
2004: 2,115
Hourly wages 1965: 946
1973: 1,871
1987: 243
2004: 2,115
Father’s occupations (78 to 241 groups de-
pending on survey); Offspring reported.
R2: Not reported
Murtazashvili,
Liu, and
Prokhorov
(2013)
US and Swe-
den
US:467
Sweden: 324
Annual earnings US: 1,613
Sweden: 565
Father’s education; Father’s occupation
Mocetti (2007) Italy 3,200 Gross income from
all sources but finan-
cial assets.
4,903 Father’s education (5 groups; Work status
(5 groups); employment sector (4 groups);
geographical area (3 groups).
R2: 0.30
Nicoletti and Er-
misch (2008)
UK 8,832 31-45 years old sons,
with positive income
(employed or self-
employed) in at least
one wave of the panel
896 Father’s occupation (4 groups); Father’s
education (5 groups).
R2: 0.31
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102
JO
H
N
JE
R
R
IM
,Á
LVA
R
O
C
H
O
IA
N
D
R
O
SA
SIM
A
N
C
A
S
Continued from last page
Sample size Offspring’ Sample size Imputer variable
Study Country (Main data) income (Auxiliary) and 1st stage R2
Nuñez and Mi-
randa (2011)
Chile 11,186 25 to 40 years old
log earnings of sons
working at least 30hs
x week
1987: 19,192
1990: 20,378
Father’s occupation (4 groups); Father’s
education (5 groups).
R2: 0.29–0.37.
Nuñez and Mi-
randa (2011)
Chile (Greater
Santiago)
649 Log income 1,736–2,700 (de-
pending on the
year)
Father’s education (3 groups); Father’s oc-
cupation (5 groups)
R2: 0.48–0.66
Piraino (2007) Italy 1,956 Gross income from
all sources bar finan-
cial assets.
953 Father’s education (5 groups); work status
(4 groups); employment sector (4 groups);
geographical area (2 groups)
R2 = 0.33.
Piraino (2014) South Africa 1,241–2,590 Monthly gross em-
ployment earnings
1,355 Education (5 groups); Occupation (5
groups)
R2 ≈ 0.40
Roccisano (2013) Italy 786 Earnings 3,203 Education; Occupation; Industry
R2 ≈ 0.20
Ueda (2009) Japan 1,114 married sons;
906 single daughters;
1,390 married daugh-
ters
Gross annual earn-
ings and income
from all sources.
Father’s years of education; Father’s occu-
pation and firm size (7 groups).
R2: Not reported.
Ueda (2013) Korea and
Japan
Both countries: size
varies depending on
civil status of the
sons and daughters
Annual earnings Korea: Fathers btw
25 and 54
Japan:
Korea: education and occupation
Japan: parental income .
R2: Not reported
Ueda (2013) Taiwan 745 Annual income 745 Father’s education (6 groups); Father’s oc-
cupation (11 groups).
R2: Not reported.
